products designated by the FDA as a new molecular entity (NME)-either a new chemical entity (NCE) or a new biological entity (NBE)-that is a "priority review" drug because it "treats a serious or life-threatening condition and… would be a significant improvement in…safety or effectiveness…compared to available therapies" 1 . Priority review products generally represent ~40% of all NMEs approved by the FDA 2 .
Although the approvals of these products are only a small proportion of all FDA actions, they are the primary arena for both technological innovation and medical advances in drug development. They sale. The biotech industry's contributions have been especially prominent in the development of biological products, as might be expected, but it has developed large numbers of smallmolecule drugs as well. Moreover, the biotech industry has done so with a fraction of the amount spent on R&D by the pharmaceutical industry.
There are hundreds of FDA approvals each year, ranging from minor manufacturing changes for marketed drugs to the initial approval of first-in-class treatments for unmet medical needs. To focus specifically on innovative medicines, this study includes only those Benchmarking biotech and pharmaceutical product development
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The biotech sector's record in originating high-priority medicines exceeds that of the pharmaceutical industry, its costs are lower and its products have comparable revenues.
T he creation of important new medicines is impressively difficult and expensive. Over the past 40 years, thousands of upstart biotech companies have set out to show that they can accomplish this goal more effectively than big pharma. In contrasting biotech and big pharma, conventional wisdom has tended to say that biotech enterprises are good at cutting-edge basic research, whereas pharmaceutical companies are better at managing drug development, securing regulatory approval and launching commercial sales; biotechs have more expertise in proteins and other biological materials than pharma, which has greater expertise in the use of traditional small-molecule drugs; and biotech companies often focus on niche-market orphan drugs, whereas pharmaceutical companies seek primarily to develop blockbusters. Now that the biotech industry is nearly four decades old, this conventional wisdom needs to be reevaluated. Assumptions that may have been true in the industry's early years no longer provide an accurate picture of modern drug development. A review of the highpriority therapeutic products approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from 1998 through 2012 shows that biotech companies not only created most of these important new medicines, but also successfully shepherded surprisingly large numbers of them all the way through to commercial Therapeutic products approved by the FDA on a priority review basis from 1998 through 2012 are the subject of this study. For each product, Michael Breidenbach of Broad Brook Research (Cedarburg, WI) and I identify the company responsible for its original development as well as the company holding the principal commercial rights at the time of FDA approval, as reported in commercial databases, company websites; and other records (EvaluatePharma Database (2009 -2012 ; http://www.evaluategroup. com/public/EvaluatePharma-Content.aspx); company websites; pharmaceutical company annual reports; and US Securities and Exchange Commission (New York, NY) 10-K filings). These identifications were then compared with similar analyses of FDAdesignated fast track products conducted by researchers at the Tufts Center For Drug Development (Medford, MA, USA) (http://csdd.tufts. edu/research/databases) and in ref. 5 .
Identifying originator and commercializing companies. There are a variety of methodological issues involved in identifying original developers. One pioneering study by Kneller 6 focused on patent filings and allocated "at least 14%" to "public research," including academic and governmental research. This approach may, in fact, underestimate the overall contribution of public research to the drug discovery process. Therapeutics are increasingly targeted to a particular molecule in the body, and they are often designed to intervene in or manipulate a specific biological process. Public research has been essential in identifying a substantial number of those potential targets and in elucidating the nature of those biological processes. It has, therefore, made vital contributions to many new drugs even if the drug itself-the NCE or NBE-was first fashioned in the laboratories of a biotech or pharmaceutical company.
The focus of this study is on drug development choices made by biotech and pharmaceutical companies, and, therefore, where an academic laboratory has created and out-licensed a drug candidate (or a target for such a drug candidate), this study identifies the corporate licensee as the original developer. Similarly, if a pharmaceutical company seeks to develop a product employing an in-licensed enabling technology controlled by a biotech company (as in cases, for example, where a biotech company creates or humanizes a mAb on behalf of the pharmaceutical company), I still credit the pharmaceutical company as the originator. If however, the biotech company initiates R&D efforts on such a product and then out-licenses it to a pharmaceutical company, the biotech company is credited as the originator.
An influential study by Munos 7 assigns full credit for new product innovation to "the company that secures a drug approval," arguing, in part, that this approach "seems to be justified, especially given that, by organizing and managing the network to gain FDA approval, that company often makes the greatest contribution to the process." This study looks separately at the originator and the commercializing company (or the 'commercial company'), the latter defined as the company holding the primary US marketing rights at the time of FDA approval. As the commercial company often takes responsibility for the FDA process, under Munos' definition, it would be deemed the innovator.
For products originating in biotech companies in cases where the biotech company was acquired by a pharmaceutical company before FDA approval of the product, I designated the originating company as biotech and the commercial company as pharmaceutical, even if the FDA approval was issued in the name of the biotech company, and irrespective of whether the biotech company continued as a wholly owned subsidiary of the pharmaceutical company.
Definition of biotech and pharmaceutical company. A biotech company is defined as a drug development company founded on or after the date of Genentech's incorporation in 1976. All other drug development companies are considered pharmaceutical companies. No distinction is made based upon whether the company is pursuing the development of NBEs or NCEs. During the time covered by this study, the number of biotech companies was reported by Ernst & Young in a series of annual reports on the industry to be between 4,000 and 5,000 in each year of this study 8 .
Criteria for inclusion of NBEs and NCEs. Despite the fact that priority review is a formal designation made by the FDA, questions have arisen in the literature as to whether to include, in analyses of priority review products, several NBEs approved between 1998 and 2003 that did not receive such a designation. Until 2003, all NBEs were reviewed by the FDA's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER); thereafter, all products in this study were approved by the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). CBER and CDER employed somewhat different standards for priority review, and nine NBEs that did not receive CBER's priority review designation could well have met the CDER standards for priority review, and they have been included as priority review products in, for example, the Kneller 6 study. This study includes only those products receiving the priority review designation from the FDA, as is the case for products designated fast track.
Revenue and R&D costs. For each product for which commercial data are available, the total global sales for the fifth full year after FDA approval have been identified using commercial databases (e.g., EvaluatePharma Database (2009-2012; http:// www.evaluategroup.com/public/EvaluatePharma-Content.aspx) and US government (US Securities and Exchange Commission) 10-K filings [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . These amounts, as well as the figures for R&D expenditures, have been expressed in 2011 dollars using the biomedical research and development price index from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (Washington, DC, USA). Sales data were obtained for 103 products. Specific sales data are not available for 17 of those products with low levels of sales, as the databases used (e.g., EvaluatePharma Database (2009-2012; http://www.evaluategroup.com/public/EvaluatePharma-Content. aspx) include only the top 500 products each year, and company documents frequently do not provide detailed sales information about products with modest sales. For the products in this category, fifth-year sales have been estimated by using the midpoint between zero and the global sales that year of the 500th ranked product; these estimated amounts range from $11.3 million to $38.91 million in annual sales, depending on the year. The remaining 59 approved products have been marketed for fewer than five years, or do not appear in the available databases, and they have been excluded from the commercial aspect of the analysis.
It was possible to obtain information on R&D spending for the years 1999-2012, and aggregate spending has been estimated for both the biotech industry and the pharmaceutical industry as Box 1 Methods used in this study
the commercial company was pharma for 91 (56%) and biotech for 71 (44%).
Fifty-three different biotech companies were responsible for developing products approved through FDA priority review from 1998 through 2012. The fact that dozens of these entrepreneurial entities were able successfully to manage the development pathway, to navigate the FDA approval process and to launch the product suggests that these skills are not sufficiently rare that they should be considered to be so essential that the company responsible for the FDA approval should be granted full credit for the entire innovation process as has been done in some published studies 7 .
The products with the highest average global sales in the fifth year after approval were originated by pharmaceutical companies, with average sales of $562.80 million per product, but the average sales of biotech-originated products was only ~5% less (i.e., ~$534.6 million). There is a modest difference in the average sales of products commercialized by pharma and biotech as well-$572.7 million for pharma compared to $512.0 million for biotech, a difference of about 11% ( Table 2) .
Is biotech more efficient?
It is impossible, without access to internal records from all these companies, to calculate the specific costs associated with the development of these products, especially because the costs would need to include the expenses associated with the many product candidates that failed during the same period. By looking at the overall R&D expenses allocable to priority review products of the pharmaceutical 70 of the 162 products (43%). Of this enriched population of products targeting patients with serious illnesses and few (if any) treatment options, biotech companies originated 49 products (70%), with the remainder originated by pharmaceutical companies.
Biotech companies originated 92% of the priority review biologics (24 of the 26 NBEs). NBEs represent only 16% of the priority review products in the study, however. The vast majority of the products (136 of 162; 84%) were NCEs. Pharmaceutical companies originated 52% of these NCEs (71 of 136), and biotech originated nearly as many NCEs as pharma (65 of 136, or 48%; Table 1 ).
Who creates blockbusters?
By the time many of the products were approved by the FDA, numerous alliances and acquisitions shifted some of the product rights from biotech to pharmaceutical companies. Of the 89 products originated by biotech, 27 (30%) were acquired by pharmaceutical companies, although it may be worth noting that a substantial majority (70%) were retained within the biotech industry, even if, in some cases, the products were acquired by one biotech company from another. In addition, 9 of the 73 products originated by pharma (12% of the pharmaceutical total) were acquired by biotech companies before FDA approval. At the time of FDA approval, also make substantial contributions to the revenues of pharmaceutical and biotech companies.
Where do new medicines originate?
Of the 162 priority review products, 89 (55%) originated in biotech companies and 73 (45%) in pharmaceutical companies (see Box 1 for the definition of origination). A total of 107 different companies were responsible for originating these products: 67 were 'biotech' and 40 were 'pharma' (I define a biotech company as any drug development company founded on or after the date of Genentech's (S. San Francisco, CA, USA) incorporation in 1976; all other drug development companies are considered pharmaceutical companies; see Box 1). Although most of the pharmaceutical companies in the study originated at least one priority review product, the remaining products resulted from the efforts of a few of the over 4,000 companies constituting the biotech industry; thus, the vast majority of biotech companies did not originate any of the products. Products receiving the FDA's Fast Track designation 3 ) for drugs "intended to treat a serious condition and [that] demonstrate the potential to address unmet medical need" constituted follows. The R&D expenses of the top 50 pharmaceutical companies ranked by global sales is available from Pharmaceutical Executive Magazine [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] and from the EvaluatePharma Database (2009-2012; http://www.evaluategroup.com/public/ EvaluatePharma-Content.aspx). Pharmaceutical company annual reports and US Securities and Exchange Commission 10-K filings were used to supplement and verify these data. After subtracting a small number of biotech companies appearing on these 'top 50' lists (typically, there were one to five of these companies in each year), the amounts from the remaining pharmaceutical companies were added together. For the biotech industry, annual total R&D expenses for the entire industry have been published in a series of reports issued by Ernst & Young (e.g., see ref. 8) . Because these amounts typically include only data from publicly traded companies, the total amount of venture capital funding raised in each year (also published in the Ernst & Young reports; e.g., see ref. 8) has been added to the R&D total.
From 1999-2012, the biotech industry as a whole-not just those companies responsible for an FDA-approved priority review drugspent ~$326.8 billion dollars on R&D. During that time period, the pharmaceutical industry had R&D expenses of ~$1.574 trillion. Because pharmaceutical companies are likely to devote a larger percentage of R&D expenses to line extensions of already approved products than biotech companies, the pharmaceutical total has been reduced by the 18% of R&D costs estimated by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA; Washington, DC, USA) to be allocated to those costs unrelated to NMEs, resulting in total new-product-related expenses of $1.290 trillion. In addition, because ~40% of FDA approvals of NMEs are priority review products, both sets of R&D expenses were reduced by 60%, leading to expenses potentially allocable to priority review NMEs of $130.7 billion for biotech and $516.4 billion for pharma. Cost per product is calculated two ways. First, when all costs are allocated to the commercializing company, cost per product is determined by dividing the number of all products commercialized by [biotech or pharma] into the total R&D expenses by [biotech or pharma] companies; and second, when all costs are equally divided between the originator and the commercializing company, the same calculation is made on the basis that products acquired by pharma from biotech, or vice versa, are counted as 0.5 product for each. 2 . In fact, since the mid-1970s, despite year-to-year variation, priority review NMEs have tended to average about ten per year. Until the 1990s, nearly all such products were originated by pharmaceutical companies. Then, during the period of this study, biotech companies originated 55% of the products, suggesting that, if not for these contributions, the average number would have dropped by ~50% to about five per year.
Box 1 Methods used in this study (continued)
This drop in productivity cannot be explained by a lack of resources, as pharma's R&D expenses have risen dramatically over the past 15 years. As the Congressional Budget Office report notes, "the pace of new-drug approvals has not matched the rise in real R&D spending" 2 . In fact, that phenomenon raises a further, potentially related question: how has the biotech industry been able not only to originate but also to develop and commercialize so many priority review products for about one-fourth of what was spent by the pharmaceutical industry?
One possibility is that the larger number of NBEs among the biotech products has brought about a different cost structure, but this seems not to be the case. Trusheim et al. 4 have noted that an extensive "literature demonstrates that biologics and small molecules have reasonably similar costs to bring to market. " Nevertheless, even though NBEs and NCEs may have the same development costs in the same disease areas, some indications require more clinical testing than others. The top-two-selling, pharma-originated drugs were approved for pain and arthritis-generally non-life-threatening, chronic conditions, requiring clinical trials enrolling over 9,000 patients before FDA approval. In contrast, the top two biotechoriginated products were for late-stage cancers, and clinical trials averaged fewer than 2,500 patients. There is, however, a substantial overlap in the indications pursued by both biotech and pharma, so product-mix decisions are unlikely fully to explain a 4:1 difference in spending.
A second possible explanation is that pharmaceutical companies acquired products from biotech companies at nearly three times the rate that biotech acquired them from pharma. Additionally, pharmaceutical companies periodically acquire biotech companies that have created a broad-based enabling technology that product-of any class of drugs in this study. Not only was pharma responsible for only 2 of the 26 NBE products, but pharma companies became the commercializing company for only 7 others, leaving about two-thirds of these products to be commercialized by biotech companies. The fact that six additional NBEs are now being sold by pharmaceutical companies as a result of post-commercialization acquisitions (e.g., the acquisitions of Genentech (S. San Francisco, CA, USA), MedImmune (Gaithersburg, MD, USA) and Genzyme (Cambridge, MA, USA)) suggests that the pharmaceutical companies may have forecast lower commercial potential for NBEs than has proven to be the case. Further support for this observation can be found in the fast track products, 70% of which were originated by biotech companies-that is, products where the medical need was previously unmet, and therefore, the commercial potential would be more difficult to forecast than would be the case for a well-served market.
But perhaps the most surprising aspect of this study is that pharma has not dominated the development of small-molecule drugs (NCEs) to the same extent that biotech companies have the development of NBEs. Many pharmaceutical companies were making small-molecule drugs for decades before the biotech industry was created, and thus they would have been expected to have an overwhelming competitive edge. Although pharma did originate a majority of the priority review NCEs, its 71 products (52%) only slightly outperformed biotech's 65 (48%). It may be worth noting, however, that pharmaoriginated NCEs are 11 of the 15 NCEs (73%) that achieved global sales in excess of $1 billion (excluding one NCE that was subsequently withdrawn from the market). The pharmaceutical industry may thus have better identified the commercial opportunities for NCEs, but many biotech companies figured out how to create and commercialize them as well.
industry ($516.4 billion) and the biotech industry ($130.7 billion) during the period of the study (see Box 1 for calculation of expenses), it may be possible, however, to provide a basis for comparing the amounts spent.
If 100% of the costs of each product are attributed to the company holding the commercial rights at the time of FDA approval, the amount of the aggregate R&D expense per FDA-approved priority review product is $5.67 billion for pharma and $1.84 billion for biotech. Because products are often acquired in the middle of the development process, I consider it more accurate to attribute half the development costs to the originator and the other half to the commercial company. Using this model, the amounts of aggregate R&D expense per product would be ~$1.63 billion for biotech and $6.30 billion for pharma, an approximately fourfold difference ( Table 3) . I discuss potential explanations for this below.
The new conventional wisdom?
Although it may not be surprising that biotech companies have originated over 90% of the biologic products, it is not clear that they did so because of exclusive access to novel technologies. All of these products are either monoclonal antibodies (mAbs; n = 13 or 48%) or recombinant DNA (rDNA)-based molecules (n = 11 or 41%), or a combination of rDNA and mAb technology often described as 'fusion proteins' (n = 3 or 11%). Well before the period of this study, the patents and other enabling technologies necessary for the development of mAbs and rDNA products were broadly available to pharmaceutical companies through licenses, alliances or acquisitions. Pharmaceutical companies acquired leading biotech companies that were focused on mAb technology as early as 1985 and many mAb technology licenses were granted to pharma by biotech companies during the 1990s and 2000s. Nevertheless, the pharmaceutical industry did not convert this technology access to the origination of products as rapidly as biotech companies did.
Because pharmaceutical companies had access to these technologies, as well as the financial resources to acquire biotech companies at essentially any stage of the R&D process, it is interesting to consider why they did not do so more often, especially as mAb-based products have the highest average sales-$2.3 billion per 
can take many forms, the fact that commercially attractive products can be acquired externally may have allowed internal programs to progress at a more deliberate speed, especially because pharma R&D personnel need to spend considerable amounts of time evaluating hundreds of in-licensing opportunities each year. Finally, if smaller companies really are so productive and efficient, why have they not supplanted big pharma altogether? One potential answer is that the biotech industry is not yet 40 years old, and with development times running 10-15 years, it may be too soon to tell whether that may still happen. But, based on the experience of the industry to date, there may be a fairly clear explanation. Pharma's financial resources are so great that successful biotech companies are frequently acquired by pharmaceutical companies, sometimes, as in the cases of Genentech, MedImmune, Genzyme and others, well after they have commercialized blockbuster products. The financial power of pharmaceutical companies allows them to continue to sell innovative products, irrespective of their origin. The question for further analysis, in light of pharma's increasing R&D costs and decreasing productivity, then, is, to what extent is it essential for pharma to conduct internal research on innovative programs, if those efforts could potentially be outsourced to a biotech industry that appears to have lower costs and higher productivity?
In summary, conventional wisdom concerning biotech and pharma needs to be adjusted. Although biotech companies have dominated the creation and development of biologic products, they have, at the same time, established a track record in small-molecule drugs nearly equal to the pharmaceutical industry's. Perhaps also contrary to expectations, biotechoriginated products do not lead to substantially lower revenues than pharma-originated products, and numerous companies in the biotech industry have demonstrated the ability to manage the complex process of clinical testing, regulatory approval and commercial launch. That biotech companies appear to have done so with a fraction of the amounts spent by the pharmaceutical industry raises the interesting question of whether innovative drug creation and development may be more efficiently conducted in a diverse array of unconnected and under-resourced, independent entrepreneurial entities than in well-organized, well-funded and highly experienced organizations. may facilitate future R&D efforts; in those cases, much of the cost will constitute R&D expenses in the year of the acquisition, even though the resulting products may not yet be in development. Such an acquisition decision is likely to be based on an assumption that the pharmaceutical company will more efficiently develop products employing that technology than could be obtained by waiting to acquire biotech-originated products through later-stage acquisitions. Evaluating such strategic choices will require further studies.
As a veteran biotech company executive who has participated in numerous alliances with pharmaceutical companies, I would suggest a further possible explanation for the higher pharma costs. The biotech industry is nearly perpetually short of cash. In financial consulting firm Ernst & Young's (London) "survival index, " in many years, most biotech companies will run out of cash within three years without further funding 5 . These companies need to move their products forward as inexpensively as possible. At virtually every development stage, there are additional tests that might be useful; there are often back-up candidates that could be developed; and so on. Biotech companies often eliminate these "nice to have" or even "really valuable to have" steps in the development pathway because they are expensive, and they appear not to be essential for FDA approval.
In contrast, pharmaceutical companies have enough funds to 'do it right'-namely, conduct drug development to maximize the likelihood that a research program will get a full and fair evaluation and to ensure that no reasonable expense is spared in the creation and testing of a potentially important new product. Whether to do bare bones or full-fledged development is a strategic choice for pharma, but both options are available to only a very small percentage of biotech companies. For many of the 67 biotech companies responsible for originating 55% of the products, the bare bones choice was likely to be the only one available. It is undoubtedly a higher risk approach, on a product-by-product basis, but with as many as 4,000 biotech companies employing it, it may on an industry-wide basis yield more efficient drug development.
This suggestion may provide a rationale for higher pharma R&D costs, but it may not fully explain the overall drop in productivity of pharma R&D. In assessing the ~50% reduction in the rate at which pharma has originated priority review products, it is worth considering that the availability of product candidates from biotech may have diminished the pressure on pharma R&D groups to produce self-originated drugs or pharma management may have deemphasized internal R&D efforts. That is, in a scientific environment in which full-fledged R&D
